John Miller and Joan Miller v. United States of America : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2003
John Miller and Joan Miller v. United States of
America : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward P. Moriarity, Jeffrey D. Gooch; Spence, Moriarity and Schuster; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellees.
Paul M. Warner; United States Attorney; Jeffrey E. Nelson; Assistant United States Attorney;
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Miller v. United States of America, No. 20030054.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2336
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
HONORABLE TENA CAMPBELL 
00 m 
EDWARD P. MORIARITY (5622) 
JEFFREY D. GOOCH (7863) 
Spence, Moriarity & Schuster 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0811 
PAUL M. WARNER 
United States Attorney 
JEFFREY E. NELSON (2386) 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
185 South State, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1506 
Telephone: (801) 524-5682 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION 
HONORABLE TENA CAMPBELL 
PAUL M. WARNER 
United States Attorney 
EDWARD P. MORIARITY (5622) 
JEFFREY D. GOOCH (7863) 
Spence, Moriarity & Schuster 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0811 
JEFFREY E. NELSON (2386) 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
185 South State, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1506 
Telephone: (801) 524-5682 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES 1 
RELEVANT STATUTE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Proceedings Below 2 
Factual Allegations 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. Legal Framework 5 
II. Plaintiffs' common-law negligence cause of action does not exist 
under Utah law 6 
III. The United States cannot be held liable under the Dramshop Act 
because it is a strict-liability statute 8 
CONCLUSION 12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14 
ADDENDUM 15 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 2, 5, 8 
28 U.S.C. § 2674 5 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.) 2, 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(l)(b)(ii)(A), (D) (1999 Repl.) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(l)(b)(ii)(B), (C) (1999 Repl.) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(6) (1999 Repl.) 6, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(7) (1999 Repl.) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) (2001) 1 
Cases 
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah), cert, denied, 
531 U.S. 1011 (2000) 6,7, 10 
Ayala v. United States, 49 F.3d 607 (10th Cir. 1995) 5 
Dalehitev. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) 5, 8,9 
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) 5, 9 
Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 995 P.2d 1233 (Utah 2000) 7 
Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 996 P.2d 540 (Utah 2000) 9, 10, 12 
Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) 7, 8 
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991) 9, 10 
U.S. v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) 5 
Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) 7, 8 
Other 
45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 502 (1999) 6 
Annotation, Right of Action at Common Law for Damage Sustained by Plaintiff in 
Consequence of Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquor or Habit-forming Drugs to Another, 
97 A.L.R. 3d 528 (1980) 6 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of the issue of law certified by the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(1)(2001). 
ISSUES 
Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah certified the following issue of law to this Court: 
Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily 
would be immune from suit in cases of strict liability, may 
be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs 
establish negligence. 
(Addendum at tab 2.) 
The United States submits that the issue as stated comprises two related 
issues: 
1. Whether a person or entity that negligently provides alcohol to an 
intoxicated person is liable to a third party who is injured by the intoxicated 
person. 
2. Whether the liability created by Utah's Dramshop Act is a form of 
strict liability that does not require proof of fault, wrongful intent, or negligence. 
RELEVANT STATUTE 
A copy of Utah's Dramshop Act in effect in 1999, when the relevant events 
allegedly occurred (Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.)), is submitted at 
tab 1 of the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
Plaintiffs John and Joan Miller sued the United States in the United States 
District Court seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. Plaintiffs allege that an employee of the United 
States negligently served alcohol to an intoxicated person in violation of Utah's 
Dramshop Act, and that the intoxicated person caused a motor vehicle accident 
that resulted in Plaintiffs' injuries. 
The United States moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on the grounds 
that (1) Utah law does not recognize a common-law negligence claim against a 
dramshop for injuries caused by an intoxicated dramshop customer, and (2) the 
United States cannot be held liable under Utah's Dramshop Act because the FTCA 
exempts strict-liability claims from its waiver of sovereign immunity. After these 
issues were briefed and argued, Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District 
Court certified to this Court the issue of state law set forth above. 
2 
Factual Allegations 
Since the issue certified to this Court arises in the context of a motion to 
dismiss, the following is a summary of the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
(U.S. District Court record, document 1.) 
Plaintiffs allege that on June 12, 1999, they were seriously injured in a 
motor vehicle accident caused by Arthur Valle. (Complaint, f 10, 17-18.) 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Valle was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that 
his intoxication caused him to drive at an excessive speed and collide with 
Plaintiffs' vehicle. (Complaint,! 10.) 
Mr. Valle was an employee of the United States Air Force. (Complaint, f 
5.) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Valle became intoxicated at the NCO 
(noncommissioned officer) Club at Hill Air Force Base. (Complaint, f 6-7.) 
Plaintiffs allege that federal employees of the NCO Club "negligently and 
carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he was "clearly and visibly 
extremely intoxicated" and allowed Mr. Valle to leave the NCO Club and drive an 
automobile while he was intoxicated. (Complaint, f 8-9.) Plaintiffs allege that 
these actions by Air Force employees violated Utah's Dramshop Act. (Complaint, 
19.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts claims for common-law negligence and for 
statutory liability under Utah's Dramshop Act. The United States is not liable to 
Plaintiffs under either legal theory. 
Plaintiffs' claim for common-law negligence is legally deficient because 
this Court has consistently held that a third party who is injured by an intoxicated 
person does not have a cause of action for common-law negligence against the 
person or entity that served alcohol to the intoxicated person. The injured party's 
only basis for relief is Utah's Dramshop Act. 
Plaintiffs cannot prevail against the United States under the Dramshop Act 
because Congress has not waived the federal government's sovereign immunity 
from that claim. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the government's immunity 
only in cases of "the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of government 
employees. This language does not include claims based on theories of strict 
liability. Since this Court has consistently held that the Dramshop Act imposes a 
form of strict liability, the United States has not waived sovereign immunity from 
claims under Utah's Dramshop Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Legal Framework 
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of the United States' 
sovereign immunity. U.S. v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). Under the 
FTCA, the United States is liable in tort claims to the same extent that a private 
person would be liable under the law of the forum state. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 
2674; see Avala v. United States. 49 F.3d 607, 610 (10th Cir. 1995). The FTCA's 
waiver of immunity is limited, however, to injuries resulting from "the negligent 
or wrongful act or omission" of a federal employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The 
United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this language to mean 
that Congress did not intend to waive the federal government's immunity from 
claims based on theories of strict or absolute liability. Dalehite v. United States. 
346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953): see also Laird v. Nelms. 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972) 
(noting that the Dalehite decision was based "on the Court's determination that the 
[FTCA] did not authorize the imposition of strict liability of any sort upon the 
Government."). 
Although Plaintiffs' Complaint is not divided into separate causes of action, 
it appears to allege two claims: (1) common-law negligence (the federal 
employees "negligently and carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he was 
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"clearly and visibly" intoxicated),1 and (2) statutory liability under Utah's 
Dramshop Act. As discussed below, the United States cannot be held liable under 
either theory. 
II. Plaintiffs9 common-law negligence cause of action does not exist under 
Utah law. 
The Utah legislature enacted the Dramshop Act in 1981. Prior to the 
enactment of the Dramshop Act, a person or entity that served alcohol to an 
intoxicated person had no liability to a third party who was injured by the 
intoxicated person. 
In 1981, the Dramshop Act was enacted and created a 
statutory cause of action, which did not exist at common 
law, against dramshops. Our legislature, like those of other 
states, passed dramshop legislation to abrogate the 
common law rule precluding the liability of a party who 
sells or otherwise provides alcohol to a person who is 
intoxicated and injures another. 
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 532 (Utah), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1011 
(2000). The common-law rule in Utah is consistent with the law in most 
jurisdictions. IdL (citing 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 502 (1999) and 
Annotation, Right of Action at Common Law for Damage Sustained by Plaintiff in 
lrThe interpretation of Plaintiffs' Complaint as alleging common-law negligence is 
corroborated by Plaintiffs' prayer for damages of "no less than two million dollars," 
which exceeds the maximum damages allowed by the Dramshop Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 32A-14-101(6) (1999 Repl.). 
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Consequence of Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquor or Habit-forming Drugs to 
Another, 97 A.L.R. 3d 528 (1980)). 'The legal theory behind the general rule is 
that when a third party is injured by an inebriated individual, it is the drinking of 
the alcohol, not the furnishing of it, which proximately causes the injury." Id. 
(citing Yost v. State. 640 P.2d 1044, 1046 n.2. (Utah 1981)). 
This Court has recognized an exception to this common-law rule only in 
cases where the alcohol purveyors violated the statute barring the sale of alcohol 
to minors. Yost. 640 P.2d at 1046; Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130, 133 
(Utah 1978). "These two cases [Yost and Rees] recognize a cause of action in 
favor of a third person against a vendor of alcohol who sells the same negligently 
and in violation of a statute to an underage purchaser, who becomes intoxicated 
and causes injury to the third person." Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp.. 995 P.2d 
1233, 1235 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). However, "neither fYost nor Rees] 
established a common law cause of action in favor of third persons against 
commercial vendors of alcohol where there was no statutory violation." Adkins, 1 
P.3d at 532. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that federal employees "negligently and 
carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he was intoxicated. This is precisely 
the type of common-law claim that this Court has consistently rejected. Mr. Valle 
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was not a minor, so Plaintiffs' claim does not fall within the narrow exception 
recognized in Yost and Rees. Consequently, Plaintiffs' common-law negligence 
claim is deficient as a matter of law. 
III. The United States cannot be held liable under Utah's Dramshop Act 
because it is a strict-liability statute. 
The nature of the liability imposed by the Dramshop Act is relevant 
because, as discussed above, the FTCA is a limited waiver of the federal 
government's sovereign immunity. Congress waived the government's immunity 
for injuries resulting from "the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of 
government employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United States Supreme Court 
has held that this language does not waive immunity for claims based on theories 
of strict liability. 
In Dalehite v. United States, the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that 
the federal government was subject to strict liability in connection with an 
explosion that occurred during the transportation of a fertilizer compound. The 
plaintiffs argued that the FTCA's imposition of liability for the "wrongful act" of a 
government employee should include liability for an allegedly "extra hazardous" 
activity such as the transportation of explosive fertilizer. 346 U.S. at 44-45. The 
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' legal 
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theory was "well known in tort law generally" but nonetheless held that the 
plaintiffs' strict-liability claim was barred because "the [FTCA] requires a 
negligent act." Id. 
The Supreme Court reiterated this interpretation of the FTCA in Laird v. 
Nelms, where the plaintiffs sought to recover for property damage allegedly 
resulting from a sonic boom caused by U.S. military aircraft. The Supreme Court 
rejected this claim because it was based on a strict-liability theory arising from an 
allegedly "ultrahazardous activity." 406 U.S. at 800-801. The Court relied on its 
holding in Dalehite that "the Act did not authorize the imposition of strict liability 
of any sort upon the Government." Id. at 803 (emphasis added). 
Although the extent of the FTCA's coverage is a federal question for the 
federal district court's determination, that issue depends on the type of liability 
imposed by Utah's Dramshop Act. The United States submits that this requires 
nothing more than a restatement of this Court's consistent interpretation of the 
Dramshop Act as a strict-liability statute. 
This Court first addressed this issue in 1991. "The dramshop statute 
imposes strict liability, the effect of which is to make it unnecessary to allege and 
prove negligence on the part of the dramshop." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 
117 (Utah 1991), overruled on other grounds. Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 996 
9 
P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 2000). "[T]he clear intent of the legislature was to 
compensate innocent third parties by making dramshop owners strictly liable 
without regard to the finding of fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on 
their part." Reeves, 813 P.2d at 116. In Red Flame, the Court partially overruled 
Reeves, holding that a dramshop's liability under the Act could be apportioned 
with the liability of the drunk driver. 996 P.2d at 543. Nonetheless, the Court in 
Red Flame confirmed the premise of Reeves that "the Dramshop Liability Act 
prescribes a form of strict liability rather than traditional negligence . . . ." Id. 
In Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., this Court again evaluated the nature of the 
liability imposed by the Dramshop Act and again concluded that it imposes "a 
form of strict liability." 1 P.3d at 532. The Court cited with approval the 
conclusion in Reeves that the legislature's purpose in enacting the Dramshop Act 
was to compensate innocent third parties without requiring proof of fault or 
negligence. Id (citing Reeves, 813 P.2d at 116). 
This Court's construction of the Dramshop Act is consistent with the Act's 
terms. As discussed above, the Utah legislature enacted the Dramshop Act to 
provide a remedy that did not exist at common law. But the legislature did not 
simply create a negligence cause of action imposing unlimited potential liability 
on dramshops. Instead, the legislature placed a cap on a dramshop's potential 
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liability. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(6) (1999 RepL), and required that any 
claim be brought within two years. Id, at § 32A-14-101(7) (1999 RepL). These 
limitations on the injured party's claim are balanced by the relaxed burden of 
proof imposed on the injured party. Rather than requiring proof of negligence, the 
Act allows an injured party to recover damages from a commercial purveyor of 
alcohol if the purveyor provided alcohol to a person who was "apparently under 
the influence" of alcohol or who the purveyor "knew or should have known" was 
under the influence of alcohol. Id at § 32A-14-101(l)(b)(ii)(B), (C) (1999 RepL).2 
These provisions are consistent with the principle of strict liability. 
Although strict-liability claims do not require proof of negligence, they 
nonetheless arise in the context of some act or event deemed worthy of imposing 
liability on the actor. Thus, for example, strict products liability is imposed 
because of a defect in design or manufacture of a product, but does not require the 
fact-finder to evaluate whether the defendant was negligent in the design or 
manufacture. Likewise, the strict liability imposed as a result of an 
"ultrahazardous" activity results from an act of the defendant - - engaging in an 
2
 Liability also exists in cases where alcohol was provided to a person under the 
age of 21 or to a "known interdicted" person. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-
101(l)(b)(ii)(A), (D) (1999 RepL). 
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inherently dangerous activity - - but does not require an examination of whether 
the defendant acted with reasonable care. 
Utah's Dramshop Act imposes liability in a similar fashion. A commercial 
purveyor is liable upon proof that it provided alcohol to a person who was 
apparently intoxicated or who the purveyor knew or should have known was 
intoxicated. The Act does not, however, require an examination of whether the 
purveyor was negligent. Thus, the liability imposed by the Dramshop Act is 
properly construed to be "a form of strict liability." Red Flame, 996 P.2d at 543. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act "to the same 
extent as a private individual." The question, therefore, is the extent of liability of 
a private person or entity under the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint. As 
discussed above, the only liability that could arise from the facts alleged by 
Plaintiffs is that imposed by Utah's Dramshop Act. 
For these reasons, the United States requests that this Court answer the issue 
certified by the United States District Court as follows: 
I. A person or entity that provides alcohol to an intoxicated person is 
not liable to a third party injured by the intoxicated person under a claim of 
common-law negligence. 
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II. The liability imposed by Utah's Dramshop Act is a form of strict 
liability that does not require proof of fault, wrongful intent, or negligence. 
DATED this 6 day of June, 2003. 
PAUL M. WARNER 
United States Attorney 
J E F F K ^ ^ ^ S O N ' 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA were hand-delivered this 
/1£*-
fr of June, 2003, to the following: 
Edward P. Moriarity 
Jeffrey D. Gooch 
SPENCE, MORIARITY & SCHUSTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Copies of the following documents are attached hereto: 
I. Utah's Dramshop Act in effect at the time of the events alleged in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.). 
II. The Order of United States District Judge Tena Campbell certifying 
this matter to this Court. 
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32A-14-101 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 
32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action — 
Statute of limitations — Employee protections. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (9), a person described in Subsec-
tion (l)(b) is liable for: 
(i) an injury in person, property, or means of support to: 
(A) any third person; or 
(B) the heir, as denned in Section 78-11-6.5, of that third 
person; or 
(ii) for the death of a third person, 
(b) A person is liable under Subsection (l)(a) if: 
(i) the person directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides an alco-
holic beverage: 
(A) to a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(ii); and 
(B) as part of the commercial sale, storage, service, manufac-
ture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products; 
(ii) those actions cause the intoxication of: 
(A) any individual under the age of 21 years; 
(B) any individual who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic products or drugs; 
(C) any individual whom the person furnishing the alcoholic 
beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances was 
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or prod-
ucts or drugs; or 
(D) any individual who is a known interdicted person; and 
(hi) the injury or death described in Subsection (l)(a) results from 
the intoxication of the individual who is provided the alcoholic 
beverage. 
(2) (a) A person 21 years of age or older who is described in Subsection (2)(b) 
is liable for: 
(i) an injury in person, property, or means of support to: 
(A) any third person; or 
(B) the heir, as defined in Section 78-11-6.5, of that third 
person; or 
(ii) for the death of the third person, 
(b) A person is liable under Subsection (2)(a) if: 
(i) that person directly gives or otherwise provides an alcoholic 
beverage to an individual who the person knows or should have 
known is under the age of 21 years; 
(ii) those actions caused the intoxication of the individual provided 
the alcoholic beverage; 
(hi) the injury or death described in Subsection (2)(a) results from 
the intoxication of the individual who is provided the alcoholic 
beverage; and 
(iv) the person is not liable under Subsection (1), because the 
person did not directly give or provide the alcoholic beverage as part 
of the commercial sale, storage, service, manufacture, distribution, or 
consumption of alcoholic products. 
(3) Except for a violation of Subsection (2), an employer is liable for the 
actions of its employees in violation of this chapter. 
846 
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(4) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) or (2) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Subsection (1) or (2). 
(5) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate. 
(6) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person 
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after January 1, 
1998, is limited to $500,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded 
to all persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $1,000,000. 
(7) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be 
commenced within two years after the date of the injury. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
(9) (a) An employer may not sanction or terminate the employment of an 
employee of a restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise beer 
retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a result 
of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judgment to 
refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee considers to 
meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection (1). 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on 
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated 
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set 
forth in Title 34A, Chapter 5, Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
(10) This section does not apply to a general food store or other establish-
ment licensed under Chapter 10, Part 1, to sell beer at retail for off-premise 
consumption. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989, 
ch. 240, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch. 23, 
§ 178; 1996, ch. 240, § 38; 1997, ch. 94, § 1; 
1997, ch. 375, § 28. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1997, in Subsection 
(8Kb) substituted the citation at the end for 










When the principal provisions of the 
Dramshop Act, as it existed prior to amend-
ment by Laws 1997, ch. 94, are read in context 
with the definitions provided by that Act, the 
Act is not ambiguous. The statute's plain lan-
guage explicitly limits liability to persons who 
provide alcoholic beverages "at a location allow-
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective 
July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A" for "Title 
35A" in Subsection (8Kb). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 94, effective 
January 1, 1998, rewrote the section. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
ing consumption on the premises [.]" Conspicu-
ously absent from the definition of "premises" is 
the word "house" or "private residence." 
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Alcohol purchased by various people and 
made available to everyone at a party was not 
supplied for a commercial purpose; thus, the 
Dramshop Act was inapplicable and the trial 
court correctly granted summary judgment in 
favor of employer and one of its employees for 
actions of another of its employees who was 
intoxicated, in plaintiff's action for damages 
based on assault and battery, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and violation of the 
Utah Dramshop Act. D.D.Z. ex rel. M.T.Z. v. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH ^\ 
DISTRICLAF UTAH NORTHERN DIVISION y r A ; 
BY: 
JOHN MILLER and JOAN MILLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. L02CV37TC 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, on its own motion, pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the certification of questions of law 
by United States courts, hereby submits to the Utah Supreme Court the following certified 
question of Utah law which is determinative of certain of Plaintiffs' claims in the above-
captioned matter now pending before this court, but which does not appear to be clearly 
answered under Utah statutory law and controlling precedent: 
Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in 
cases of strict liability, may be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs 
establish negligence. 
Background1 
On June 12, 1999, Plaintiffs John and Joan Miller ("the Millers'1) were seriously injured 
1
 Because this action is before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the background facts are 
accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 
in a car accident caused by Arthur Valle. Mr. Valle was intoxicated and driving at an excessive 
speed when his car collided with the Millers' car. 
Mr. Valle was an employee of the United States Air Force and had been drinking at the 
NCO Club at Hill Air Force Base on the night of the accident. The Millers contend that the 
employees of the NCO Club "negligently and carelessly" served alcohol to Mr. Valle when he 
was "clearly and visibly extremely intoxicated." The employees of the NCO Club then allowed 
Mr. Valle to leave the NCO Club in his car. 
As a result of the accident, the Millers were seriously injured, Joan Miller required 
extensive medical treatment and will continue to require medical treatment in the future. She is 
disabled and unable to work. John Miller suffered several injuries, including a right 
pneumothorax and a fractured ankle. Mr. Miller missed work because of his injuries and the 
need to assist in his wife's recuperation. The Millers have extensive medical expenses as a result 
of the accident. 
The Millers allege that the government is liable for damages they suffered under the 
Federal Tort Claim Act ("FTCA" or "the Act") (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)), in part, for negligently 
selling alcohol in violation of Utah's Dramshop Act, UTAH CODE ANN, § 32A-14a-101, et seq. 
The government moves to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). 
Discussion 
The FTCA waives the government's sovereign immunity with respect to claims based on 
"the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of a government employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
2 
The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that this language does not waive immunity 
for claims based on theories of strict liability. See Dalchite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,45-46. 
(1953); see also McKay v. United States, 703 R2d 464, 472 (10,b Cir. 1983) ("Nor does the 
FTCA authorize actions against the government based on strict tort liability."); Laird v. Nelms, 
406 U.S. 797, 798-799 (1972) (liability cannot be imposed under the FTCA absent some 
negligence or wrongful act or omission). "Accordingly, liability [under the FTCA] cannot be 
imposed without a finding of the presence of negligence or some other recognized misfeasance 
or nonfeasance on the part of the government." kL (citing Laird, 406 U.S. at 799). In this case, 
the Millers have alleged, in part, negligent acts by employees of the Air Force, which they claim 
violate Utah's Dramshop Act. 
The government contends that Utah's Dramshop Act is a strict liability statute and is the 
exclusive remedy for acts within its coverage. See Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 532 
(Utah 2000) (stating that Utah's Dramshop Act imposes strict liability). The government argues 
that because a claim of negligence against purveyors of alcohol is unavailable, the Millers cannot 
avail themselves of the Dramshop Act against the government to pursue what is, essentially, a 
negligence action. See Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P,2d 305, 310 (Utah 2000) ("[Njcgligence is 
preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts that the Dramshop Act reaches."); Adkins. 1 
P.3d at 532 (stating that Utah has never had a common law claim against one who furnishes 
alcohol to a person who subsequently injures a third person due to drunkenness and that 
"Dramshop acts are enacted to fill [this] void "). 
The Millers, however, point to the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Smith v, Pena, 621 
3 
F.2d 873 (7lh Cir, 1980), a case factually similar to the one here. In Smith, the court found that if 
plaintiffs could prove that under Illinois law the Army employees were negligent in serving 
drinks to an intoxicated person, and thus establish the required causation, their FTCA action 
could be maintained. Id, In making this determination, the court reasoned that: 
Absolute liability exists under the Dram Shop Act because the niinois legislature wished 
for both penal and remedial purposes to impose liability on more tavern operators, not 
fewer, than if a negligence standard were used. It would be incongruous if in 
circumstances where the state has cast its net wider than in a traditional negligence 
action, a Government employee is automatically excused from liability even if his 
negligence can be proved. 
Id. 
In the interest of cooperative judicial federalism, this court believes that the question of 
Utah law presented in this case is best answered by the Utah Supreme Court. Sec Lehman Bros, 
v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974). 
Conclusion 
This court concludes that the question outlined herein is unsettled under existing Utah 
law. Accordingly, the clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this Certification to counsel for 
all parties to the proceedings in this court. The clerk also shall submit to the Utah Supreme 
Court a certified copy of this Certification, together with the briefs filed in this court and any 
portion of the record before this court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Pursuant 
4 
to Rule 41(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this court orders that the fees and costs 
of this Certification shall be apportioned equally between the parties. 
DATED this J ? day of January, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
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